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Excise Taxes with Multiproduct Transactions 
By Stephen F. Hamilton* 
Exchange in retail markets often involves transactions of more than one product at a time, as 
is the case of consumer purchases at department stores, restaurants, and supermarkets. These 
purchases are frequently taxed and subject to retail sales or value-added taxes (VAT) that are 
applied across multiple products at once in a single transaction. What are the implications of 
excise taxes in markets mediated by multiproduct firms? And to what extent do the results from 
tax models based on single-product transactions generalize to the case of multiproduct trans­
actions? The efficiency and incidence of excise taxes in noncompetitive markets has been an 
important theme in the field of public economics since the early analysis by Augustin Cournot 
(1838) and Knut Wicksell (1896). Yet, in light of the multiproduct nature of most retail transac­
tions, it is surprising to note that virtually everything we know about the effect of excise taxes in 
oligopoly markets is derived from models with single-product firms. 
One reason for the lack of research on taxes in multiproduct oligopoly markets is that the 
analysis of simultaneous price and product variety choices is complex, and this has limited the 
scope for designing tractable models.1 I examine the effect of excise taxes on multiproduct trans­
actions in this paper by framing a model that is capable of generating comparative statics effects 
in oligopoly settings in which both prices and the breadth of products available at each retailer 
are jointly determined. The key feature that provides traction in this framework is a combination 
of the symmetric substitutes utility structure of A. Michael Spence (1976a, b; 1977) and Avinash 
K. Dixit and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1977) and the locational preference structure of Steven C. Salop 
(1979). The locational preference structure allows the strategic interactions between retailers to 
occur at a highly aggregated level, which insulates these forces from multiproduct composition 
effects that arise through cross elasticities of demand. This creates a clear separation between the 
intraretailer and interretailer margins of the model. 
I frame the analysis of excise taxes around multiproduct firms that select prices and a breadth 
of product variety, and consumers who choose where to shop. Consumers derive utility directly 
from the consumption of individual products and indirectly from the amount of product variety 
available. The locational attributes of firms themselves also convey value to consumers, as would 
be the case when consumers select among restaurants based on proximity as well as on prices 
and the extensiveness of wine lists. All products are taxed and a change in excise tax rates alters 
equilibrium prices, the equilibrium breadth of product variety available in the market, and, in the 
free-entry case, the equilibrium number of firms. 
An important theme in the tax literature is the extent to which excise taxes shift forward 
into consumer prices in oligopoly markets. Recent academic interest in this topic parallels the 
growing policy concern in the United States regarding the distributional consequences of con-
sumption-based taxes and has currency in the long-standing debate in the European Union on 
tax harmonization. In single-product oligopoly models, Jesus K. Seade (1987), Nicholas H. Stern 
(1987), and Sofia Delipalla and Michael Keen (1992) show that excise taxes are shifted more than 
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one-for-one into consumer prices when demand is sufficiently convex. Recent empirical evidence 
corroborates this potential. Timothy J. Besley and Harvey S. Rosen (1999) exploit regional differ­
ences in excise tax rates and retail prices across US states for a range of products sold at super­
markets, fast-food restaurants, and department stores, and they find evidence of overshifting for 
more than half the products in their sample. This empirical outcome is puzzling in light of tax 
theory with single-product firms. As Anderson, de Palma, and Brent Kreider (2001b) observe, 
the high degree of demand convexity necessary to generate the overshifting of excise taxes is 
ruled out by standard oligopoly assumptions; for instance, specific taxes are overshifted in the 
short run only when industry demand is steeper than marginal revenue, and ad valorem taxes 
are overshifted only when the marginal revenue curve for the industry demand curve slopes up 
instead of down. 
I show here that quite the opposite is true with multiproduct firms. Under a mild regularity 
condition on consumer preferences for variety, excise taxes are shifted forward more than one-
for-one into consumer prices in all cases except when demand is highly convex. The reason 
that overshifting readily occurs with multiproduct firms is that higher excise taxes cause firms 
to divest product variety, and this softens price competition and facilitates the overshifting of 
taxes into prices. Product divestiture does not happen when demand is highly convex, however, 
because the same forces that lead taxes to increase price-cost margins and raise profits for single-
product firms now provide incentives for multiproduct firms to introduce new products. Price 
competition intensifies, and excise taxes are shifted forward less than one-for-one into consumer 
prices. 
One of the oldest issues in the formal study of public finance is the comparison of ad valorem 
and specific forms of excise taxation. Following Wicksell’s (1896) observation that ad valorem 
(percentage) taxes may have favorable efficiency properties relative to specific (unit) taxes in 
monopoly markets, Daniel B. Suits and Richard A. Musgrave (1953) formally derive this result 
by comparing aggregate welfare at tax positions that are equivalent in terms of the total tax 
yield. Delipalla and Keen (1992) extend this result to homogeneous product oligopoly markets 
with single-product firms and show that ad valorem taxes are welfare superior to equal-yield 
specific taxes in both the short-run and long-run market equilibrium. The reason for the superior 
performance of ad valorem taxes is that the tax bill is indexed to the market price under an ad 
valorem tax, and this makes residual demand functions (net of taxes) more price elastic, thereby 
narrowing equilibrium price-cost margins. 
But narrow price-cost margins deter product introductions in multiproduct settings. I show 
that the relative performance of ad valorem and specific taxes depends on the extent to which 
consumer preferences for variety are increasing in per product consumption levels. If consumer 
preferences for variety are increasing in per product consumption levels (the usual case), the 
ability of ad valorem taxes to stimulate output relative to equal-yield specific taxes tempers the 
otherwise adverse implications of ad valorem taxes for product variety. The welfare superiority 
of ad valorem taxes over equal-yield specific taxes in multiproduct settings depends, accordingly, 
on whether consumer preferences for variety are “strongly increasing” in per product consump­
tion levels. 
Multiproduct transactions alter the market structure implications of excise taxes as well. When 
excise taxes are levied on single-product firms, Besley (1989) and Anderson, de Palma, and 
Kreider (2001b) demonstrate that excise taxes are shifted into prices in a greater range of cases 
in the long run than in the short run. The opposite is true with multiproduct firms. An increase 
in excise tax rates generally decreases the equilibrium breadth of product variety, which softens 
price competition and reduces the fixed costs associated with multiproduct entry. Firms enter 
the industry in the long run and, as a result, taxes are overshifted into prices in a larger range 
of cases in the short run than in the long run. Yet, entrants crowd out product variety, and this 
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has negative welfare effects. In the penultimate section of this paper, I numerically examine the 
market outcomes in the case of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences and find that 
aggregate welfare declines more sharply with excise taxes in the long run than in the short run. 
This suggests that the essential spirit of Besley’s (1989) argument may be impervious to multi­
product transactions. 
I. The Model 
Consider an industry comprising n multiproduct retailers. The retailers are differentiated in 
terms of their spatial proximity to consumers, and competition is localized in the sense that 
consumers compare only neighboring retailers in deciding where to shop. Each retailer is repre­
sented as a point on a circle of unit length and, following Salop (1979), the problem of location 
choice is suppressed: whatever the number of retailers happens to be, they are always equally 
spaced about the circle. 
Consumers are distributed about the circle with a constant density per unit length and incur 
increasing transportation costs over distance to visit retailers. As in the spatial duopoly model 
of Robert Innes and Stephen F. Hamilton (2006), consumers purchase multiple products on each 
shopping occasion. 
I consider the class of preferences, first analyzed by Spence (1976a,b, 1977) and Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) and subsequently pursued by Kai-Uwe Kühn and Xavier Vives (1999). Specifically, 
I describe preferences by the aggregate utility function U 1z,y 2 5 G 1z 2 1 y, where z is a compos­
ite commodity and y is the consumption level of a numeraire good. G 1z 2 is an increasing function 
with constant elasticity 11 2 e 2 [ 10,12 , and the consumption level of the composite commodity 
` 
z is determined by the subutility function z 5 ei50 f 1xi 2di, where xi is the amount consumed of 
variety i and f 1x 2 is a smooth, increasing, and strictly concave function for all x . 0. 
To develop observations on the effect of excise taxes on multiproduct retailers, it is necessary 
to characterize the intensity of preferences for product variety. This depends on the elasticities of 
f 1x 2 and f 9 1x 2 . Let u 1x 2 5 f 9 1x 2x / f 1x 2 denote the elasticity of f 1x 2 and let g 1x 2 5 2xf 0 1x 2/f 9 1x 2
2denote the elasticity of f 9 1x 2 . 
Inverse demand for variety i for the representative consumer is 
(1) p 1z,xi 2 5 G9 1z 2 f 9 1xi 2 . 
For symmetric allocations, inverse demand per product, p 1m,x 2 5 G9 1mf 1x 2 2 f 1x 2 , is decreasing 
p, x in m and x. Specifically, the output elasticity of inverse demand with respect to price is e 1m,x 2
5 s 1x 2 , where s 1x 2 ; g 1x 2 1 u 1x 2e, and the output elasticity of inverse demand with respect to 
p,m product variety is e 1m,x 2 5 e. 
Equation (1) implicitly defines the demand functions for the representative consumer, xi 1m,p 2 , 
where m is the number of products available at a given retailer and p is the associated vector of 
prices. The demands can be used to recover indirect utility, v 1m,p 2 . This allows: 
LEMMA 1: The effect of a change in product variety on consumer utility is 
0v 1m,p 2 1 2 u 1xm 2 
0m
5 a
u 1xm 2 b pmxm. 
2 For symmetric solutions, g 1x 2 is the inverse elasticity of substitution between any two goods. 
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In a symmetric allocation, 1 2 u 1x 2 measures the degree of consumer preference for variety. 
It is the proportion of social benefits not captured by revenues when a new product is introduced 
(i.e., 1 2 G9f 9x /G9f 5 1 2 u 1x 2 2 . Product variety is less valuable to consumers for larger values 
of u 1x 2 , and the products are perfect substitutes (i.e., indifference contours are hyperplanes) as 
u 1x 2 S 1. 
Aggregate demand facing the representative retailer depends on the decision made by con­
sumers at each point on the circle regarding where to shop. Let t denote consumer transportation 
cost per unit distance. A consumer at a distance of d [ 10,12 from the representative retailer 
could achieve surplus of v 1m,p 2 2 dt by purchasing from that retailer. If there are n retailers
located about the circle, for consumers located on the interval 0 # d # 1/n between a retailer 
and his nearest neighbor, the surplus available by purchasing from the rival retailer is v 1m,p 2 2 
t 11 /n 2 d 2 , where v 1m,p 2 is indirect utility evaluated at the prices and product varieties of the 
rival. Let d* denote the location of the consumer who is indifferent between these two alterna­
tives. Then d* solves v 1m,p 2 2 dt 5 v 1m,p 2 2 t 11/n 2 d 2 , or 
1 1 
d* 31m,p;m,p 2 5 1 3v 1m,p 2 2 v 1m,p 2 4 . 
2n 2t 
All consumers located at a distance of d # d* prefer to shop with the representative retailer and 
more distant consumers prefer to shop with the rival. 
Now consider the retailer’s problem. Each retailer pays a fixed set-up cost, F, and a constant 
unit cost of c to stock an individual product. All products are subject to taxation, and excise 
taxes are levied through some combination of specific tax rates 1t2 and ad valorem tax rates 1a 2 . 
Variable profit per consumer (net of taxes) for the representative retailer is 
(2) p 1m,p 2 5 3` 1 11 2 a 2pi 2 c 2 t2 xi 1m,p 2di, 
i50 
and total profit is 
mP 1m
m 
,p;m,p 2 5 2d* 1m,p;m,p 2p 1m,p 2 2 3` Fdi. 
i50 
Notice that the model produces a clear decomposition of profits into an interretailer margin and 
an intraretailer margin. On the interretailer margin, relative prices and the relative breadth of 
product variety across retailers shift consumers between the representative retailer and her rivals 
through the term d* 1m,p;m,p 2 . On the intraretailer margin, relative prices and the total amount 
of product variety available at a given retailer determine the allocation of sales per customer 
macross products through the term p 1m,p 2 . 
The first-order necessary condition for profit maximization with respect to pi is 
m 
m(3)
2xi
p 1m,p 2 1 2d* 1m,p;m,p 2 a 0p 1m,p 2b 5 0, 
t 0pi 
3 The focus of the paper is on established retail markets in which at least a subset of consumers are willing to switch 
between retailers on the basis of changes in relative prices and product variety. Accordingly, this formula and the ones 
that follow hold only in the range of interretailer competition v 1m,p 2 2 t/n , v 1m,p 2 , v 1m,p 2 1 t/n. To avoid out­
comes where an equilibrium may fail to exist, it is assumed that these inequalities are always met. 
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where use has been made of Roy’s identity in deriving the first term (0d*/0pi 5 2xi/2t 2 . This is an 
intuitive condition. The first term on the left-hand side is the effect of price i on the interretailer 
margin. A small increase in price of dpi units shifts 1xi/t 2dpi consumers away from the retailer 
and toward her rivals. Because each consumer accounts for p m in multiproduct rents, the effect 
of the price increase on the interretailer margin is to reduce profits by 1xi/t 2p mdpi units. The 
second term on the left-hand side is the effect of an increase in price i on the intraretailer margin. 
If faced with a constant number of customers (d* given), the retailer would select multiproduct 
monopoly prices, 0p m/0pi 5 0 for all i, to maximize rents on the intraretailer margin. When the 
number of customers is endogenous, retail prices are set below the monopoly price level, 0p m/0pi 
. 0, because the first term on the left-hand side of equation (3)—the effect of the price increase 
on the number of customers—is negative. 
Equation (3) provides a Ramsey-type rule for selecting a mix of price discounts to meet a 
desired price level on the intraretailer margin. Comparing this condition across any two prod­
ucts i and j, i Z j, retailers discount prices below the multiproduct monopoly level to maintain 
xj0p m/0pi 5 xi0p m/0pj. 
Increased variety provision intensifies price competition. To see this, notice that the number 
of customers served by the representative retailer, d* 1m,p;m,p 2 , acts as an implicit weight on the 
intraretailer margin in the determination of equilibrium prices. Larger values of d* endow retail­
ers with more customers, which weakens business-stealing incentives to discount retail prices. If 
a rival retailer extends her product line, the additional variety available at that retailer increases 
consumer utility from shopping with the rival, and this reduces the number of customers who 
shop with the representative firm. The retailer responds to the rival’s increase in product variety 
by selecting lower prices on all products. 
Variety choices are governed by the remaining first-order condition, 
mpm xm 1 2 u 1xm 2 m 0p 1p,m 2(4)
t
a
u 1xm 2 b p 1p,m 2 1 2d* 1p,m;p,m 2 a 0m b 2 F 5 0, 
where use has been made of Lemma 1 in deriving the first term. This condition has a similar 
interpretation as equation (3). The latter two terms on the left-hand side of (4) describe the opti­
mal provision of product variety for a retailer facing a given number of consumers. A monopoly 
retailer would set the sum of these terms equal to zero. The first term on the left-hand side of (4) 
is the effect of introducing a new product on the interretailer margin. The effect is positive— 
providing greater product variety attracts customers away from rivals—and this leads oligopoly 
retailers to provide wider product ranges than would be the case under monopoly. 
Notice that the outcome for the retail oligopoly equilibrium depends only on the strategic 
interaction of prices and variety selection on the interretailer margin of these equations. Each 
consumer considers the utility level that can be derived from retailers at the available product 
ranges and prices and decides where to shop. This implies the rather convenient property that 
the equilibrium of the multiproduct oligopoly model does not depend on whether retailers select 
prices 1p 2 or per product output levels 1x 2 . Nevertheless, because it is helpful for expositional 
purposes to consider the market conditions as implicit functions of x and m, I express retail prices 
hereafter in terms of m and x to motivate this interpretation.4 
The equilibrium price per product, pe, and the equilibrium number of products, me , in the 
short-run allocation are determined by the simultaneous solution of equations (3) and (4). The 
4 I elaborate on these details in the online Appendix (available at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/ 
aer.99.1.458). 
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long-run equilibrium 1pc ,mc,nc 2 is determined by these two equations and the entry condition, 
which states that profits are zero. In the symmetric case, this implies 
x 
(5) 1 11 2 a 2p 1m,x 2 2 c 2 t2 2 F 5 0. 
n 
II. Changes in Excise Tax Rates 
Central to the analysis of the equilibrium effects of excise taxes is how consumer preferences 
for product variety are influenced by changes in the level of consumption per product. This is 
measured by the elasticity of u 1x 2 , 
eu 1x 2 5 u9 1x 2x /u 1x2 . 
In his excellent survey of the Chamberlinian model, Vives (1999, 171) refers to the case of eu 1x 2
, 0 as “increasing preferences for variety” and describes this outcome to be the normal case. 
When eu 1x 2 , 0 at x, an additional product provides greater utility on the margin at high levels 
of per product consumption than at low levels of per product consumption. 
To better understand consumer preferences for variety, it is helpful to express this term as eu 1x 2
5 b 1x 2 2 s 1x 2 , where b 1x 2 5 1 2 11 2 e 2u 1x 2 . b 1x 2 can be interpreted as the net effect of a 
product introduction on consumer surplus, taking into account the effect of the change in product 
variety on per product inverse demand. When e 5 0, demand per product is perfectly elastic in 
m, so that the introduction of a new product does not alter the valuation of existing products, b 1x 2
5 1 2 u 1x 2 . When e . 0, new products cannibalize a portion of their sales from demand for 
existing products (the shift in the dd curve in Chamberlinian terminology). The cannibalization 
of sales from existing products when a new product is introduced reduces the proportion of social 
benefits captured by revenues on existing products. 
The difference, b 1x 2 2 s 1x 2 , gives the sign of the change in consumer surplus that would 
arise from a marginal reallocation between the number of products and output per product at a 
given level of consumption.5 Increasing preferences for variety, eu 1x 2 , 0, implies that consumer 
surplus rises at x with a change in market composition toward higher output per product and a 
smaller variety range. 
The degree to which consumer preferences for variety are increasing in consumption levels 
has important implications for the relative efficiency of ad valorem and specific taxes. Define 
consumer preferences for variety to be “strongly increasing” at x if 
l 1x 2 ; eu 1x 2 1 11 2 e 2 11 2 u
b 
11xx22 2u 1x 2s 1x 2e , 0. 
It is well known in the single-product case that the effect of excise taxes on the market equi­
librium depends on the elasticity of the slope of inverse demand, E ; 2pxxx/px. This is true in 
5 Formally, let s 1m,x 2 5 G 1z 1m,x 2 2 2 p 1m,x 2mx denote consumer surplus in the symmetric allocation, and con­
sider changes in the consumption level of the composite commodity that satisfy dz 5 f 1x 2dm 1 mf 9 1x 2dx 5 0. This 
yields 
ds 1x,m 2
 5 mp 1m,x 2 3s 1x 2 2 b 1x 2 4 .Zdx dz50 
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the multiproduct case as well. Before deriving specific propositions from the present model, it is 
helpful to restrict attention to cases in which per product demand functions are not too convex: 
ASSUMPTION 1. E # 2. 
ASSUMPTION 2. 2e $ 1. 
Assumption 1 rules out cases in which marginal revenue functions slope upward. Assumption 2 
ensures that the subutility function of the representative consumer is strictly concave at symmet­
6ric allocations for arbitrarily small values of g 1x 2 . Together with increasing preferences for 
variety, eu 1x 2 , 0, these assumptions guarantee that single-firm and industry profits are concave 
in x and m.7 
In oligopoly models with single-product firms, excise taxes reduce output, increase prices, 
and precipitate the exit of firms in the long run. The following result characterizes the market 
outcomes in settings with multiproduct firms. 
PROPOSITION 1: If eu 1x 2 # 0, an increase in excise taxes in the short run: 
(i)	 Reduces equilibrium output per product; 
(ii)	 Narrows the equilibrium range of product variety; and 
(iii) Increases prices per product. 
If eu 1x 2 # 0, an increase in excise taxes in the long run: 
(i)	 Reduces equilibrium output per product in the case of specific taxes, but increases equi­
librium output per product in the case of ad valorem taxes; 
(ii)	 Narrows the equilibrium range of product variety; 
(iii) Increases prices in the case of specific taxes and increases prices in the case of ad 
cvalorem taxes when s 1x 2 . 1; and 
(iv) Stimulates entry of multiproduct retailers. 
When excise taxes are levied on multiproduct retailers, an increase in tax rates narrows the 
equilibrium range of product variety. This softens price competition and facilitates retailer entry 
by reducing the fixed costs of maintaining the equilibrium product assortment. While it is con­
ceivable for prices to decrease in response to ad valorem taxes when retailers operate on the elas­
tic portion of per product demand functions s 1x 2 , 1, such an outcome for prices is possible only 
for parameterizations of the model that involve highly convex demand combined with constant 
or weakly increasing preferences for variety. In the case of CES preferences, which satisfies all 
these conditions, the long-run equilibrium price per product increases with ad valorem taxes. 
In single-product oligopoly markets, it is well known that excise taxes are overshifted into 
prices when demand is sufficiently convex. Besley and Rosen (1999) find empirical support for 
s 	 s6 That is, Gxx  2 Gmx  5 12e 2 12u 1x 2 1 g 1x 2e, where “5” denotes “equals in sign.” Gmm Gxm
7 For details, see Lemma A1 in the online Appendix. 
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the overshifting of taxes on commonly purchased retail products such as bananas, bread, sham­
poo, milk, and soda. This evidence is puzzling in light of the critique by Anderson, de Palma, 
and Kreider (2001b) that the degree of demand convexity necessary to generate the overshifting 
of taxes is ruled out by standard assumptions of oligopoly models. In the short run, Seade (1987) 
demonstrates that specific taxes are overshifted into prices when E . 1, which implies that the 
industry marginal revenue curve is steeper than demand, and Delipalla and Keen (1992) show 
that ad valorem taxes are overshifted into prices when E . 2, which implies that the marginal 
revenue curve associated with industry demand slopes up instead of down. 
The opposite is true in multiproduct retail environments. 
PROPOSITION 2: If eu 1x 2 # 0, in the short run: 
(i) Specific taxes are overshifted into prices when E , 1 1 e 1 s 1x 2 /b 1x 2 ; and 
(ii) Ad valorem taxes are overshifted into prices when E , 1 1 s 1x 2 2 1u 1x 2s 1x 2 2/b 1x 2 . 
If eu 1x 2 # 0, in the long run: 
(i) Specific taxes are overshifted into prices when E , 1 1 2e; and 
(ii) Ad valorem taxes are overshifted into prices when E , 1 1 s 1x 2 . 
When consumers have increasing preferences for variety, excise taxes are shifted forward 
more than one-for-one into consumer prices in multiproduct retail environments with linear or 
concave demand, and can be undershifted only when demand is highly convex. The reason that 
excise taxes are overshifted in a wide range of cases is that retailers generally respond to higher 
taxes by narrowing their variety ranges, which softens price competition and facilitates the shift­
ing of taxes into consumer prices. But under the highly convex demand conditions associated 
with increased price-cost margins and larger profits in response to higher excise tax rates on 
single-product firms, an increase in excise taxes provides multiproduct firms with an incentive 
to introduce new products. This intensifies price competition and leads excise taxes to shift less 
than one-for-one into prices. 
COROLLARY 1: If eu 1x 2 # 0, excise taxes overshift into prices in a wider range of cases in the 
short run than in the long run. 
With single-product retailers, Besley (1989) and Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001b) 
demonstrate that excise taxes are more likely to be overshifted into consumer prices in the long 
run than in the short run. The opposite occurs with multiproduct firms. Entry occurs in response 
to higher excise tax rates, and this places greater competitive pressure on prices in the long-run 
market equilibrium. 
III. Welfare Analysis 
When excise taxes are levied on multiproduct transactions, taxes influence consumer utility 
by altering the market provision of output and product variety. In the long run, taxes also alter 
consumer transportation costs by changing the number of firms. In this section, I first examine 
the implications of excise taxes for economic efficiency, as measured by the change in aggre­
gate welfare following an increase in excise tax rates. I then consider the relative efficiency of 
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ad valorem and specific taxes by calculating the effect of tax reforms that shift the balance of 
taxation between the two instruments while maintaining a constant tax yield. In each case, the 
interaction effects of preexisting taxes are suppressed for expositional purposes by evaluating 
all effects at an initial zero tax position 1a 5 t 5 02 .8 I complement this approach in the next 
section by using numerical techniques to examine the market equilibrium at positive levels of 
tax revenue. 
I take aggregate welfare to be the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus in the mar­
ket. Consider, first, the short-run market equilibrium. Letting f 5 1a,t2 denote the vector of 
policy variables, aggregate welfare at a symmetric allocation is given by 
t 
9W 1f 2 5 G 1m 1f 2 f 1x 1f 2 2 2 1 y 2 m 1f 2 1cx 1f 2 1 nF2 2 . 
4n 
– 
The final term in the welfare expression represents consumer transportation cost, where d 5 1/4n
is the average traveling distance between consumers and retailers in the symmetric equilibrium. 
This cost is constant in the short run, and the welfare change with respect to a change in the rate 
of excise taxation, accordingly, is 
(6)
0W
0f
1f 2
5 m 3 1p 1m,x 2 2 c 2 4 
0
0
f
x
1 c ap 
u 
1m1x, 2x 2 2 cb x 2 nFd 00m f . 
At the socially optimal resource allocation 1m* ,x*2 , each of the terms in square brackets equates 
with zero. By inspection of terms, output per product at the social optimum satisfies p 1m* ,x*2
5 c. Product variety at this price level is provided to equate the marginal utility of variety, 1 11 2 u 2/u 2 cx *, with the marginal cost of distributing a new product across retailers in the mar­
ket, nF. 
In general, the market equilibrium diverges from the social optimum as the result of two 
distortions. The first distortion is an appropriability effect. Retailers in the market fail to fully 
acquire the rents from the sale of products to consumers, and this deters output per product (vari­
ety given) and dampens the incentive to introduce new varieties (output given). The appropri­
ability effect leads the market to provide a smaller breadth of product variety and lower output 
levels than in the socially optimal resource allocation. The second distortion is the business-
stealing externality. When selecting a mix of product variety and prices, retailers fail to account 
for the negative effects of lower prices and improved product assortments on the sales made by 
rival retailers. The business-stealing effect leads the market to provide larger variety ranges and 
higher output levels than is optimal. The market allocation diverges from the social optimum 
according to the relative gravitation of these effects. 
I evaluate the implication of excise taxes on aggregate welfare at the market equilibrium posi­
tion. The qualitative effects of excise taxes on aggregate welfare do not depend on the explicit 
values of n; however, it is analytically convenient to examine these effects at the zero profit posi­
e c e ction 1m 1n 2 , x 1n 2 2 . Making use of equations (3)–(5), inverse demand per product in the market 
equilibrium satisfies 
8 In the case of equal-yield tax reforms that exchange specific taxes for ad valorem taxes, this implies examining 
combinations of positive ad valorem taxes and negative specific taxes (subsidies). 
9 This formulation assumes that the tax revenue collected by the regulator is a pure transfer that is unrelated to the 
welfare outcome.
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p 1x 2 5 c 1 t2b x , 111 2 a 2k 11x 22 
where k 1x 2 5 b 1x 2 2 11 2 u 1x 2 2s 1x 2 . 0. Substituting this value into equation (6), the efficiency 
implications of excise taxes at the zero tax position are characterized by 
0W
0f
1f 2
5 
11 2 u 
k 
11xx 2 22 cmx c s x1x 2 00xf 1 ub1x1x2 2m 00m f d . 
Notice that aggregate welfare is increasing both in output per product and in the variety range. 
It follows from Proposition 1 that an increase in excise tax rates unambiguously harms welfare 
when consumer preferences are increasing in variety. 
In the long-run market equilibrium, welfare at a symmetric allocation is given by 
t 
W 1f 2 5 G 1m 1f 2 f 1x 1f 2 2 2 1 y 2 m 1f 2 1cx 1f 2 1 n 1f 2F2 2 
4n 1f 2 . 
The marginal benefit of an additional retailer in the aggregate welfare calculation is the reduc­
2tion in consumer transportation costs, t/ 14n 2 . The marginal cost of an additional retailer is the 
expense of providing the product assortment, mF, and the socially optimal number of retailers is 
selected to equate these terms. 
The number of retailers operating in the market equilibrium generally differs from the socially 
optimal number according to the relative magnitude of the appropriation effect and the business-
stealing effect discussed above. For the case of CES preferences, which I examine below, retail­
ers in the market equilibrium undersupply product variety, and the number of firms is excessive 
from the social perspective. 
Differentiating the welfare expression with respect to the policy variable (f) and making use 
c c cof terms from the market equilibrium 1m ,n ,x 2 gives 
0W 1f 2 11 2 u 2 cmx s 1x 2 0x b 1x 2 0m 1b 1x 2 2 4u 1x 2e 2s 1x 2 0n 
0f
5 
k 1x 2 c x 0f 1 u 1x 2m 0f 1 4u 1x 2en 0f d . 
Under conditions of free-entry, policies that increase output and widen the breadth of prod­
uct variety lead to an improved resource allocation; policies that increase the number of firms 
improve aggregate welfare when b 1x 2 . 4u 1x 2e. 
PROPOSITION 3: If eu 1x 2 # 0, an increase in excise taxes at the zero tax position harms aggre­
gate welfare in both the short-run and the long-run market equilibrium. 
One of the oldest issues in the study of public finance is the comparison of ad valorem and 
specific forms of taxation. In homogeneous product oligopoly markets with single-product firms, 
it is well known that ad valorem taxes welfare dominate specific taxes. The reason is that ad 
valorem taxes make after-tax residual demand functions more elastic, and this narrows equi­
librium price-cost margins in the market. In differentiated product environments, Anderson, de 
Palma, and Kreider (2001a) show that ad valorem taxes have adverse effects on product variety 
relative to specific taxes when single-product firms operate under a fixed aggregate output con­
straint. In settings where output and product variety decisions are jointly determined, intuition 
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might suggest that the use of ad valorem taxes introduces a trade-off in consumer utility functions 
between higher output levels and lower variety ranges relative to specific taxes. But this is not 
so. When consumer preferences for product variety are increasing in per product consumption 
levels, ad valorem taxes can lead to superior outcomes for both output and product variety than 
equal-yield specific taxes. 
To see this, consider an arbitrary tax reform between ad valorem and specific tax instruments 
that preserves the existing tax yield. For any combination of excise tax rates, the total tax yield 
is T 5 1ap˜ 1 t2 m˜x˜, where p˜ 5 pe , m˜ 5 me, and x˜ 5 xe in the short run and p˜ 5 pc , m˜ 5 mc, and x˜
5 xc in the long run. Differentiating these expressions and evaluating terms at an initial zero tax 
position,10 a revenue-neutral shift from specific taxes to ad valorem taxes satisfies 
dt 
(7) 5 2p˜.Zda T50 
PROPOSITION 4: If eu 1x 2 # 0, a revenue-neutral shift from specific taxes toward ad valorem 
taxes at an initial zero tax position: 
(i) Increases equilibrium output per product; 
(ii) Increases the equilibrium range of product variety in the short run when eu 1x 2 # 
2eu 1x 2s 1x 2 and in the long run when eu 1x 2 # 2e2u 1x 2 ; 
(iii) Leads to exit of retailers in the long run when l 1x 2 , 0; and 
(iv) Leads to an improved aggregate welfare allocation when l 1x 2 , 0. 
Conversely, specific taxes welfare dominate ad valorem taxes for a range of parameterizations 
of the model when l 1x 2 $ 0. Such an outcome is more likely to occur when consumer prefer­
ences for variety are nonincreasing in x and when per product demand functions are highly 
convex, conditions that hold in the case of CES preferences I examine below. 
IV. Example: CES Preferences 
I consider here the case in which preferences for the composite commodity are characterized 
uby constant elasticity of substitution (CES), z 5 ei`50 xi di with 0 , u # 1 given. For the CES 
class of preferences, consumer preferences for variety are constant with respect to changes in x
and E 5 2 2 11 2 e 2u. 
I numerically examine equal-yield tax positions for the subutility function G 1z 2
`
 ei50 xi
5 A A udi B12e. This allows the outcomes of the numerical model to be compared for combi­
nations of ad valorem and specific taxes that correspond to identical tax yields after accounting 
for the equilibrium adjustments in the endogenous variables that take place in response to taxes. 
Parameter values in the baseline calibration of the model are A 5 1, e 5 0.5, u 5 0.5, c 5 0.5, F
5 0.01, t 5 1, and, in the short-run model, n 5 2 (duopoly). 
10 Evaluating equal-yield tax reforms at the initial zero tax position is consistent with the approach taken by Besley 
(1989) and corresponds to the concept of “P-shifts” examined by Delipalla and Keen (1992). Suppressing second-order 
effects on tax revenue that arise through equilibrium responses to marginal changes in the composition of excise taxes 
clarifies the results by providing a smaller apparatus to sift through. In the Section IV, I numerically examine equal-
yield tax positions at positive revenue levels and account for equilibrium adjustments in the market variables. 
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Table 1—Equal-Yield Tax Comparison in the Short Run 
Revenue Tax instrument 
Ad valorem Specific p 
Equilibrium value 
m x P/n W 
T 5 0.00 — — 1.03 7.33 0.040 0.0048 0.792 
T 5 0.01 a 5 0.035 — 1.09 6.57 0.040 0.0067 0.759
— t 5 0.040 1.14 6.79 0.037 0.0071 0.756
T 5 0.02 a 5 0.074 — 1.16 5.82 0.040 0.0085 0.721
— t 5 0.097 1.29 6.14 0.034 0.0097 0.709
T 5 0.03 a 5 0.120 — 1.25 5.00 0.040 0.0100 0.675 
— t 5 0.200 1.57 5.25 0.029 0.0127 0.637
Table 2—Equal-Yield Tax Comparison in the Long Run 
Revenue Tax instrument Equilibrium value 
Ad valorem Specific p m x n W 
T 5 0.00 — — 1.00 6.44 0.046 2.28 0.769 
T 5 0.01 a 5 0.037 — 1.04 5.34 0.049 2.45 0.723 
— t 5 0.040 1.08 5.52 0.046 2.46 0.722 
T 5 0.02 a 5 0.081 — 1.09 4.22 0.054 2.69 0.670 
— t 5 0.098 1.20 5.51 0.046 2.72 0.664 
T 5 0.03 a 5 0.138 — 1.16 3.07 0.061 3.06 0.602 
— t 5 0.202 1.40 3.27 0.046 3.19 0.578 
Table 1 reports the short-run outcomes for prices, variety, output, profits, and welfare under 
combinations of ad valorem and specific taxes that attain a given government revenue target. The 
entries in Table 1 indicate that prices and profits rise with the level of the tax collection, while 
output, variety, and aggregate welfare decline. Ad valorem taxes welfare dominate equal-yield 
specific taxes in all cases. This is true despite the fact that consumer preferences for variety are 
constant and demand is highly convex 1E 5 1.752 , conditions that tend to favor specific taxes. 
This outcome suggests the use of ad valorem taxes as a rule of thumb in markets with multiprod­
uct transactions. 
Table 2 presents the long-run effects of excise taxes. The entries indicate a similar qualitative 
pattern in the market response to excise taxation as in the short run, with the exception that taxes 
result in per product output levels that are (at least weakly) increasing at higher levels of tax 
revenue. A comparison of the entries in Tables 1 and 2 reveals the superior efficiency of excise 
tax policy in the short run: in all cases, higher tax rates are required for the regulator to attain a 
given revenue target in the long run than in the short run. For a given tax yield, aggregate welfare 
correspondingly declines by more in the long run than in the short run. For instance, to attain the 
T 5 0.01 tax level, welfare declines 4.2 percent from the pre-tax position with ad valorem taxes 
in the short run and declines 6.0 percent with ad valorem taxes in the long run. Excise taxes are 
overshifted into prices to a greater degree in the short run than in the long run, but taxes reduce 
product variety to a greater degree in the long run. The combination of these effects leads to infe­
rior welfare performance of excise taxes in the long run. This suggests that the essential spirit of 
Besley’s (1989) argument may be immune to the specification of multiproduct transactions. 
V. Conclusion 
In this paper I have extended the analysis of excise taxes to consider the case of multiproduct 
transactions. Under circumstances in which consumer preferences for variety are increasing in 
per product consumption levels, excise taxes reduce output and product variety in the short run; 
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however, ad valorem taxes raise output per product in the long run and both ad valorem and 
specific taxes facilitate the entry of multiproduct firms. 
Excise taxes have substantially different implications for market performance in settings with 
multiproduct firms. With single-product firms, taxes are shifted forward into consumer prices 
more than one-for-one when demand is highly convex, and are more likely to be overshifted in 
the long run than in the short run. With multiproduct firms, taxes are more likely to overshift into 
prices when demand is concave than when demand is convex, and the extent to which taxes are 
shifted into consumer prices is mitigated in the long run with entry. 
The relative efficiency of ad valorem and specific forms of excise taxes in multiproduct envi­
ronments depends on the extent to which consumer preferences for variety are altered by changes 
in per product output levels. The superior ability of ad valorem taxes to preserve equilibrium 
output levels vis-à-vis equal-yield specific taxes is offset in the case of multiproduct transac­
tions by potentially detrimental effects of ad valorem taxes on product variety provision. When 
consumer preferences are strongly increasing in consumption levels, the ability of ad valorem 
taxes to stimulate output relative to equal-yield specific taxes tempers the adverse variety effects 
of excise taxes, and ad valorem taxes welfare dominate specific taxes; however, the converse is 
also true. Specific taxes welfare dominate ad valorem taxes that are equal in terms of total tax 
yield for a range of parameterizations of the model. Such an outcome is more likely when prefer­
ences for variety are constant or weakly increasing in per product consumption levels and when 
demand is highly convex. 
There are numerous practical reasons why tax reforms frequently favor the use of ad valorem 
taxes over unit taxes; for instance, ad valorem taxes automatically adjust to inflation and can 
simplify problems of international tax coordination. These practicalities exist and are perhaps 
even more compelling in settings with multiproduct transactions. The relative efficiency of alter­
native forms of excise taxes in multiproduct contexts warrants greater attention as globalization 
increases the reach of retailers in providing product variety to consumers. 
The multiproduct oligopoly framework developed in this paper can be readily extended to 
consider other policy questions. In particular, the model has a natural extension to international 
trade policy. The locational framework pursued here provides a clear decomposition between 
the variety-based motivations for gainful trade considered by Paul R. Krugman (1980) and the 
spatial patterns of cross-border trade that emerge in Ravi Kanbur and Keen (1993). International 
tax differentials have important implications for cross-border trade in practice, and the potential 
for transactions to occur simultaneously in multiple products produces economies of scope in 
consumer transaction cost functions. Multiproduct settings with endogenous variety selection 
are therefore likely to intensify tax competition by increasing the international movement of 
tax bases that arise from given indirect tax differentials, which, in turn, can alter the ability of 
governments to design credible rent-shifting policies. Ignoring the multiproduct nexus between 
taxes and trade, among other things, is thus likely to understate the gains from international tax 
coordination. 
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